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 Systemic risk elicitation: Using causal maps to engage stakeholders and build a comprehensive view of 
risks  
ABSTRACT 
As evidenced through both a historical and contemporary number of reported over-runs, managing projects can 
be a risky business.  Managers are faced with the need to effectively work with a multitude of parties and deal 
with a wealth of interlocking uncertainties. This paper describes a modelling process developed to assist 
managers facing such situations. The process helps managers to develop a comprehensive appreciation of risks 
and gain an understanding of the impact of the interactions between these risks through explicitly engaging a 
wide stakeholder base using a group support system and causal mapping process. Using a real case the paper 
describes the modelling process and outcomes along with its implications, before reflecting on the insights, 
limitations and future research. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
In both the public and private arenas large complex projects are frequently beset with significant problems 
causing them to both run over time and budget (Flyvberg et al, 2003).  Whilst there are a number of tools and 
techniques developed to manage projects, for example Project Risk Registers or Critical Path Analysis (Project 
Management Institute 2011) these, as yet, do not appear to have eradicated cost overruns as expensive events 
(risks) continue to occur. Moreover, while good risk management can help, there appears from both the 
literature and practice to be a predisposition to focus on technical and financial risks rather than take a wider, 
more comprehensive view (Ackermann et al, 2007) thus limiting the effectiveness of the activity.  
In addition to taking a narrow view, another contributor to the complexity of managing risks is the involvement 
of an increasingly extensive array of stakeholders. Not only is this due to large turn-key projects typically 
involving a wide range of suppliers and sub-suppliers, but also the inclusion of consultants, joint venture 
partners, local/national governmental authorities and the general public (Williams, 2002). Each of these 
stakeholder bodies has different power and interest bases (Ackermann and Eden, 2011a) and has its own 
understanding of the objectives of the project and how they tie in with their own core organizational goals 
(Ackermann and Eden, 2011b).  In addition, each of these stakeholders not only has different working cultures 
and languages (Engwall, 2003) but also different financial imperatives making effective collaborative working 
difficult. Analysis on projects that have experienced considerable overruns have found the risks relating to 
politics  (Engwall, 2003) suppliers, customers, contractors, force majeure events, etc. often cause the problems 
(Ackermann et al, 2007) – corroborating the point regarding the multiplicity of stakeholders and their attendant 
problems.  
Furthermore, many of the techniques take a very discrete view in terms of analysing and managing risk. For 
example, project risk registers work on the underlying assumption that risks exist independently from one 
another (Morris and Pinto, 2004). However, this assumption does not work in practice with an increasing body 
of researchers arguing that risks have significant implications for one another rendering management more 
difficult (Williams, 2000).  For example, Williams et al (1997) argue that ‘the impacts that some risks have 
might compound the impact of others – so the effect of two risks might be more than the sum of the two 
individual effects thus reflecting systemicity’ (p.345). This view is clearly presented in work by Eden et al. 
(2005) who describe the non-linear growth as ‘amoebic’. However, it should also be noted that although other 
recent articles (Fang et al, 2003; Kazemi and Mosleh, 2012) aspire to modelling dependencies between risks in 
large complex projects they still tend to anchor on the classical risk identification methods, despite 
acknowledging their limitations. Finally Hartman (2003, p21) underlines the prevailing view that projects are 
becoming increasingly byzantine commenting that ‘risk management is not only more complex, but more 
important than ever' recognising the emergence of a preference for turn-key projects.  
Although as noted above, there are a number of tools used for project risk management  including Monte Carlo 
simulation, decision trees, risk breakdown structures, probability and impact matrices,  Project Risk Registers 
(PRR) are “the most common administrative device” (Williams 1993 p7) for identifying, assessing, attributing 
ownership of and management of risks. The importance of the PRR is also emphasised by the PMBOK (PMI 
2004) which identifies that PRR has a role in 8 out of the 9 steps involved in the project risk management 
process. However, as noted above there are a number of limitations with this tool. It is therefore important to 
recognise that new approaches for managing risk in projects taking account of multiple perspectives in terms of 
the wide consideration of risks and their management, a broad comprehensive surfacing of risks, and an 
appreciation of systemicity, are necessary, particularly in today’s world of tightening economic conditions, 
increasing volatility and progressively more complex projects.  In reviewing these considerations, problem 
structuring methods (Rosenhead & Mingers, 2001) and support systems for group decision making - Group 
Support Systems (Jessup and Valacich, 1993) seem well placed. For example, problem structuring methods, 
such as causal mapping, provide a way of capturing the systemic view of an issue (Ackermann and Eden 
2011b). In addition, group support systems provide a way in which multiple perspectives and thus a wide range 
of risks can be gained from a range of stakeholders in a fair and structured manner. This supports the 
development of a comprehensive view of a situation. 
This paper therefore describes the use of a process that engages a problem structuring method, causal mapping, 
within a group support system to elicit a comprehensive view, from a wide range of stakeholders, of the risks 
facing a project. The process aims to alleviate, at least to some extent, the considerations discussed above and is 
one that has been applied extensively in practice to support a management team in their complex and often 
strategic decision making processes. By incorporating knowledge from the field of problem structuring, the 
process provides a means of going beyond the traditional approaches to risk analysis to one that is inclusive, 
comprehensive and systemic. The paper thus commences with a brief introduction to a case study where the 
process has been used, before examining the basis for the process, and finishing with conclusions, limitations 
and next steps/future work. 
2. CASE STUDY 
The power station providing most of the energy for the Shetland Islands, a small group of islands at the northern 
end of Scotland, required replacement (due partly to age and partly to the changes in emissions regulations). The 
design of the new power station would be informed by an analysis of Shetland’s energy requirements and the 
availability and feasibility of other generation options to meet this demand.  Moreover, as part of Scotland’s and 
the UK’s wish to increase renewables (to help manage climate change), as well as recognising the impact of 
rising fuel prices (experienced particularly in Shetland due to its remote location), there was a desire to use 
renewables to meet a greater proportion of energy demand and reduce reliance on fossil fuels.  However, 
incorporation of new renewables is constrained by the capacity of the existing electricity grid and a lack of a 
grid connection to the mainland.  Thus, Scottish Hydro Electric Power Distribution (SHEPD) designed the 
Northern Isles New Energy Solutions (NINES) project to trial a range of smart grid innovations to reduce 
capacity constraints and increase exploitation of renewable energy resources, while maintaining energy security 
– ‘keeping the lights on’.  The NINES project outcomes would therefore inform the design of the new power 
station particularly its capacity.  
The NINES project thus assesses the potential of different generation portfolios combined with smart grid 
technologies to meet current and future demand.  This requires understanding the area’s energy demands 
ranging from domestic use to public services, e.g. hospitals, factories and refineries. In addition, it is important 
to understand the network implications of the generation options which differ in terms of voltage and frequency 
variance, reliability of supply and transmission formats.  Finally, there is an imperative to build longevity into 
the solution – as the option chosen will have to operate for at least 20 years and therefore needs to be robust 
against a range of different uncertain and shifting futures.    
SHEPD invited academics with competences in electrical/power engineering, economics and management 
science (focusing on risk) to be involved in the NINES project.  The authors of this paper were involved in the 
risk identification and quantification element of the project. The particular objective was to identify, structure, 
quantify and work through the implications of risks pertaining to the NINES project with regards to the different 
design options as well as taking note of the wider environment as seen by key stakeholders. Inputs to the 
framework would be existing data/documentation, and extensive stakeholder discussions elicited through 
workshops and semi-structured interviews.    
The project kicked off with a series of three risk workshops. The first workshop involved the NINES team 
(University researchers and energy company project managers), the second involved Shetland islanders 
(including councillors, wind farm owners, etc.) and the last involved technical members from the energy 
company (SHEPD).  Each workshop involved between 8 and 16 people ensuring a wide range of perspectives 
were incorporated as well as gaining buy in and ownership. The selection of participants was agreed between 
the NINES project manager and the workshop facilitators. The facilitators sought to bring together a range of 
experts from within the project (offering suggested job titles/roles for participants) in addition to a range of 
external stakeholders that had significant interest in the NINES and repowering projects to ensure broadest 
coverage and ownership. However, the final selection was influenced by the project managers’ personal view of 
those people who would provide useful input to the sessions and those for whom it was strategically important 
to include. Availability on scheduled workshop days also influenced the final list of participants. 
3. THE PROCESS 
As the above discussion regarding project risk illustrates there are considerable difficulties in managing projects 
given their growing complexity. It could be argued therefore that managing project risk, particularly state-of-
the-art projects, is akin to resolving wicked or complex problems (Ackoff, 1981; Rittel and Weber, 1973) and 
thus using methods such as problem structuring/ Soft OR (Rosenhead and Mingers, 2001) may provide valuable 
means of managing complexity. Both forms of modelling - project risk management and resolution of wicked 
problems - attend to eliciting multiple perspectives accrued from different stakeholder bodies yielding a more 
comprehensive appreciation, support the capturing and exploring not only the risks/issues but how they impact 
one another addressing systemicity, and contend that it is critical to develop a shared understanding of the whole 
in order to determine appropriate ways forward. Thus, incorporating elements from the Soft OR/problem 
structuring methods arena into risk analysis and management appears logical and coherent.  
Moreover as noted in both modelling areas, finding a manageable process that is not unwieldy demanding large 
amounts of time and/or resources is paramount.  This requirement entails finding a means of managing the 
complexity, and so not losing the systemic benefits, whilst also attending to the demands of organisational life 
(for example, managing competing priorities for time, organizational culture/politics etc.). As such the process 
design for the risk workshops was based on an existing body of work which focused on the use of causal 
mapping to capture not only the risks but also their impacts upon one another as well as the use of a Group 
Support Systems - GSS (Jessup and Valacich 1993). Causal mapping is a technique based on personal construct 
theory (Kelly 1957) and developed to be used either individually or in groups. The maps themselves are 
representations of perceptions of a situation which can be woven together with the views of others if a group 
elicitation mode is adopted. From this integration of views directed graphs comprising nodes and relationships 
are compiled. There are clearly defined formalisms for the capture of nodes and relationships with the networks 
enabling both exploration and analysis of the resultant structure. For a fuller description of causal mapping see 
Bryson et al (2004). 
Group decision support methods enable greater productivity through their ability to support participants in 
contributing simultaneously to the unfolding representation - by providing participants with the facility to enter 
contributions into a shared space. In addition, these systems also support anonymity and thus reduce the 
conformity pressures that participants experience when being identified with specific contributions (Jessup and 
Tansik, 1991; Valacich et al, 1992).This is particularly useful for avoiding negative group behaviours such as 
Group Think (Janis 1972),  Abilene Paradox (Harvey 1988) etc. 
One reason behind this choice was that there had already been a precedent for GSS supported causal modelling 
(Ackermann and Eden, 2005; Howick et al, 2006) illustrating that the GSS could help with managing the 
multifarious demands on management time through enabling the rapid gathering of views, causal relationships 
and preferences and enabling considerable progress to be achieved in a relatively short duration. Moreover the 
particular GSS software to be used – Group Explorer – enabled the structuring of contributions, management of 
complexity, and an enhanced understanding of the systemic situation through building a causal map amenable to 
analysis (Ackermann 2012), helping to manage the complexity and provide participants with the means of 
navigating the emergent structure.  In addition, Group Explorer enabled participants to negotiate effective 
management options (Ackermann and Eden, 2010; Eden and Ackermann 2010).  
The workshops followed mostly the same design, namely the generation of risks, consideration of the 
relationships between risks (risk systemicity) and the identification of priorities.  Group Explorer (GE) ensured 
that models of around 200 contributions could be built in a relatively short period of time with each workshop 
taking between 4 and 5 hours. Participants were provided with consoles through which they could enter risk 
statements, links between the risks, and priorities. In addition, a public screen provided the facility to display the 
collation of all of the views and facilitated continual amendment and development of the emerging picture.  In 
addition, the facilitator had access to a third computer which displayed participant activity allowing her to see 
which participants were actively contributing, what was being contributed, and whether there was universal 
agreement on priorities. 
Thus the key stages in the process were as follows: 
3.1 The elicitation of risks as perceived by the workshop participants  
An objective of the elicitation process was for participants to consider a wide range of risks, going beyond 
technical risks to consider political, environmental, strategic risks etc. This was a key consideration for the client 
organisation for a number of reasons. Firstly the project was a significant departure from the usual projects 
embarked upon and thus a more comprehensive view was considered necessary. It would help in determining 
which risks needed immediate attention, which need to be monitored and would help alert those working on the 
project as to possible problems. Secondly, as the project was being monitored by the regulator, considering 
concerns from the wider stakeholder body was both politically important but also beneficial in achieving the 
first objective. Inclusion of stakeholders from all parts of the project, each with their own specific concerns, 
helped to achieve this objective.  Selection of these stakeholders was informed by considering the depth and 
breadth of knowledge held by participants, their power and interest bases and more pragmatically, their 
availability. Whilst those having a risk management responsibility were involved, a more inclusive selection 
was chosen reflecting the novel nature of the project and the political ramifications.  
For the workshop a definition of risk was adopted that was sufficiently broad to encourage as comprehensive 
range of risks to be surfaced.  This definition was ‘an uncertain event or condition that, if it occurs, has a 
positive or negative effect on the projects objectives’ PMBOK (2013 p310) as this was familiar to many.  
Participants were paired, allocated a laptop computer, asked to consider risks that may be associated with the 
NINES project and type these into GE. Each risk not only appeared on the participant’s console but also on the 
public screen allowing participants to ‘piggy back’ off each other and trigger as comprehensive a range of risks 
as possible (see figure 1). The process enabled fast elicitation of risks as multiple participants could contribute at 
the same time. To support this activity the facilitator attempted to cluster the risks into themes based on their 
content – allowing participants to cognitively manage the growing body of material rather than face overload. 
The clusters also enabled a quick overview of the themes to be conducted allowing participants to see what had 
been generated and prompting further contributions as missing areas became obvious. As a result of the 
clustering, being involved in the gradual build-up of the unfolding material and also use of an extremely high 
resolution projector, participants were able to read, absorb and work with the material displayed on the screen. 
In addition, regular print outs of the maps were provided to the group to allow for more detailed scrutiny. 
Figure 1 about here – photo of group working 
3.2 Structuring and linking of the risks  
Once the rate of participants’ contributions had significantly slowed down and it was perceived that they had 
exhausted their reservoir of risks, the process moved on to explore how the risks impacted one another.  This 
part of the process facilitates consideration of the systemicity of the risks (Howick et al, 2006; Ackermann et al, 
2007; Williams et al 1997) highlighting that risks do not occur in isolation from one another  and reflecting the 
connective nature of the PMBOK definition. As already noted, it is often the interaction between different types 
of risk that can cause the most damage to a project (Eden et al, 2005; Eden et al 2000; Williams et al 1995). A 
risk event in one area/category may cause, or contribute to the likelihood of a risk event somewhere else. For 
example, a supplier going out of business may have an impact on a particular aspect of the engineering arena or 
a change in government may affect funding allocations. Thus, risks can be seen as a network of interrelated 
possible events, which may be referred to as ‘risk systemicity’. Risks are linked to one another through the use 
of arrows where an arrow from ‘Risk A causes, exacerbates or promotes Risk B’ (Williams et al 2004, p221). As 
risks are linked to one another, a ‘risk map’ is created (an example of this can be seen in Figure 2 below). This 
modelling process not only enabled the group to move from a fairly divergent set of views to a more convergent 
set but also triggered the generation of new material as the rationale for the links was explicated and captured.  
Figure 2 about here 
3.3 Prioritisation of risks  
In each of the workshops, the facilitator identified those risks which were both substantially impacted by, and/or 
had an impact on, the other risks in the map using central and domain analyses
1
 (Eden and Ackermann, 1998).  
These risks were then focussed on during the next part of the workshop. Using GE, participants were asked to 
prioritise these ‘key’ risks with respect to likely probability and impact. At this stage, only relevant sections of 
the risk map were displayed to reduce cognitive overload so that participants could focus on those risks that 
were seen to be of most importance. Again, this activity was predominantly carried out in pairs
2
, enabling 
discussion amongst each pair of participants in addition to discussion between the different pairs when the final 
prioritisation was displayed on the public screen.  This discussion not only enabled participants to explain their 
own reason for prioritisation, but also allowed them to consider other people’s views, broadening their 
understanding of the perspectives of other stakeholders and developing a more holistic appreciation for the 
potential risks and their consequences.  This prioritisation was undertaken by asking participants to rate the 
selected ‘key’ risk statements on a scale of 0 to 100. 0 related to the risk which they believed would have the 
least impact on the project if it occurred whereas 100 related to the risk which they believed could have the 
greatest impact on the project if it occurred. Other risks were then positioned relative to these two anchor points. 
 A second prioritisation activity was also carried out. Participants were asked to consider those risks which they 
believed were most probable to occur in the short term i.e. the next 6 months and those risks that they believed 
were most probable to occur in the long-term i.e. in 2 years when the final portfolio of energy sources was to be 
confirmed to the regulator. This stage of the process enabled  identification of those risks that needed most 
attention and thus required careful management both immediately and in the near future. For some risks, there 
was general consensus within the results from the prioritisation activity. However, for other risks, time was 
allocated to explore the differences in participants’ views. The result of this step was to provide SHEPD with a 
prioritised agenda for risk management to provide guidance on where to focus their limited resources. 
3.4 Enhancing the risk map after the workshop  
                                                          
1
 A domain analysis calculates the number of links directly in and out of a statement (risk). The central analysis 
not only calculates the immediate links in and out but in addition incorporates statements (risks) linking 
into/out of the statements linking in and out but with a diminished weighting 
2
 In one of the workshops due to the uneven number of participants, one participant worked solo; in another 
of the workshops, there was a trio of participants using a console 
Participants were given the opportunity to add to or amend the risk map after the workshop. Workbooks 
displaying themed views from the risk map were sent to participants to provide them with the opportunity to add 
further risks, or to add or amend links between the risks. One reason for this activity was the limited time 
available in the workshops and thus the appreciation that participants may wish to include further material after 
leaving the workshop. A second reason was to promote the risk map as a dynamic (rather than static) tool which 
can be updated as new knowledge becomes available.  
3.5 Feedback on the process  
Interviews with individual participants were carried out following two of the workshops
3
 , partly as an 
additional way of gaining further material as a part of step (iv), but also to gain feedback on the process. This 
feedback was of particular importance in order to enhance the process for the second tranche of workshops to be 
carried out a year later. 
3.6 Analysis of the resultant material  
Once the workshop maps had been augmented with the material generated during the interviews, the three 
models were analysed to determine their constituent properties (Ackermann and Eden, 2011; Sterman 2000). 
Each model was considered separately as their idiographic properties provided important insights in relation to 
managing the messy complex situation. Moreover as the workshops were being conducted to inform the client 
SHEPD (rather than participants working to determine a single unified representation) there was no demand to 
integrate the models – the client preferred to keep the insights located with each workshop as the particular mix 
of participants provided valuable contextual information. However, it was possible to gain some form of 
triangulation as insights that emerged across all three workshops gained greater salience. Details of the analysis 
and the resulting insights are discussed below. 
3.7 Reporting findings 
The output from the workshops and the subsequent analysis was reported back to SHEPD. For each workshop, 
the report highlighted the themes that emerged, the most significant risks and those risks that were perceived by 
the participants to be of priority. In addition, overlapping themes between the 3 workshops were discussed.  
                                                          
3
 they were not used following the first workshop with the NINES team as this was seen as a pilot workshop and 
members were in regular contact with one another 
Appendix 1 provides an overview of the stages with associated benefits, limitations, process, outputs and 
additional contributions noted. 
 
4. INSIGHTS FROM THE ANALYSIS 
As mentioned in section 3.6, each of the risk maps created from the three workshops was analysed to determine 
their constituent properties.  This involved examining the extent of the perceived systemicity of the risk maps, 
identifying the most significant risks, considering the potential impact of any feedback loops and a general 
comparison of the maps created from each of the workshops. Each of these activities will be considered below 
along with the insights gained. It should be noted the insights gained are a mixture of insights from both the 
perspective of the researchers (focussing on the process of the workshops and analyses) as well as the client 
(focussing on the content of the workshops and the resulting analyses). 
 Systemicity of the risk map: An initial examination was made of the ratio of the number of statements in 
the maps to the number of links as this provides some insights into the perceived systemicity of the 
network. The three workshops revealed statement link ratios of 145:150, 207:290, and 156:197. A typical 
ratio when working with causal maps is around 1:1.3 or 1.4. The low ratio in the first workshop (NINES 
team) highlighted the paucity of links elicited. This relatively thinly linked structure was due to the focus 
for the workshop. It was seen as a pilot workshop where time had been concentrated on considering themes 
rather than links (for example themes relating to the environment etc.). Although the consideration of 
common themes was introduced in previous situations to great effect, this activity was found to be of less 
value to understanding the structure of the risk network. The focus on themes whilst creating the maps was 
therefore removed from the later workshops. Moreover, the thinly linked structure in the first workshop 
resulted in some areas of opaqueness in the risk map where risks were not clearly connected into the 
network and their meaning was not totally transparent. This occurrence was therefore reduced in the later 
workshops through spending more time considering the impact that a risk would have on the project.  This 
highlighted that, processually, there was more of a need to understand the systemicity than the potential 
themes.  
 A second point to note is that the number of links/statements correlated closely with the number of 
participants (there were more participants in the second workshop than the first and third). The second 
workshop (Shetland) also involved participants with a wider variety of backgrounds. It therefore also 
suggests that involving different perspectives generated more information than when only involving those 
apparently embedded with the project i.e. the NINES team.  
 Identification of the most significant risks: Two analyses mentioned above, domain and central, which 
concentrate on identifying significant risk statements, were run as part of the process of identifying 
emergent themes that naturally fall out of the network (Bryson et al, 2004).  From these analyses 6-8 themes 
were highlighted for each workshop, identifying groups of risks which should be considered together as a 
part of the risk management process as they are interrelated and thus may have an impact on one another. 
Rather than simply providing an extensive list of risks which focusses management on each individual risk, 
it enables clusters of risks to be focussed on together, ensuring that any action taken is appropriate for the 
whole cluster of risks.  In addition, five common themes were highlighted across the three workshops 
indicating areas that were of concern across the wide range of participants and thus possibly were 
particularly important and required further attention. These included issues such as protecting 
reputation/brand, managing staffing and project overruns (the first two being away from the traditional 
financial/technical considerations).   
Furthermore, when clustering the material into themes, information was gained from the shape of the map 
sections relating to a theme. For example, if the section of the risk map was a broad horizontal shape, then 
this meant that a breadth of knowledge in the area was demonstrated, but there appeared to be a lack of 
depth of knowledge. Similarly, a narrow vertical shape demonstrated depth rather than breadth of 
knowledge round the theme. This observation may suggest further work is required in attempting to better 
connect the themes with the rest of the risk network.  Another explanation for the ‘shapes’ may be the 
particular mix of participants in the workshop and may suggest additional people being asked to contribute 
to the process. In any case, potential areas of weakness in knowledge are highlighted to the client thus 
moving towards a more encompassing risk process. 
 The impact of feedback loops: This included determining whether there were any feedback loops 
suggesting dynamic behaviour (Sterman, 2000). Once in place, this type of behaviour can be difficult to 
resolve (Cooper, 1994; Williams, 1995) and thus its identification and consideration with respect to the 
project was seen to be an important part of the analysis of the risk map.  An example of a feedback loop that 
was highlighted is shown in Figure 3. 
 
Figure 3: Extract from the SHEPD risk map that includes feedback loops 
 
From the common theme of ‘managing staff’ the feedback loops in Figure 3 highlight the importance of 
ensuring adequate skill and knowledge in staff when operating the systems as this will ensure SHEPD 
perform well which may impact being awarded future projects which, in turn, will impact their reputation 
and thus the ability to attract future good staff.  
 Comparison of risk maps: There were some interesting results when comparing the second and third 
workshops (Shetland and SHEPD). The material from the SHEPD workshop demonstrated more 
common/convergent thinking. Although this demonstrated clarity of direction which can be useful when 
implementing a project, it potentially lacked the creativity of ‘thinking outside of the box’. The Shetland 
workshop brought a different, and wider, perspective to the consideration of risk, helping SHEPD to 
augment their thinking. This broadened SHEPD’s perspective on potential issues well beyond what would 
normally be covered in a standard risk register. For example, only 12 risks were identified in the NINES-
specific risk register provided by SHEPD and while probability and impact are used to rank these in 
importance, as was carried out in the workshop, no explicit connection or linkage is made between them
4
. 
Moreover the risks can be clustered into 3 broad categories; technical, commercial and project delays, 
suggesting a somewhat narrower focus than was apparent in the workshops. The Shetland workshop also 
added to SHEPD’s understanding of the perception of the wider stakeholders involved in the project. 
Communication with the local community formed a crucial part of the project, thus understanding the 
concerns of the participants helped SHEPD to tailor communication with respect to the project more 
appropriately to gain buy-in from the local community.  A second insight gained was that even though the 
three workshops were intended to be done at similar times, practicalities meant that there were a few weeks 
in-between each. The material gathered was different due to the different participants; however it was also 
noted that emphasis changed depending what was happening on the project at that point in time i.e. what 
was forefront of participants’ minds. This highlighted the dynamic nature of the project and the need for a 
project risk process that captured this changing profile e.g. regular risk workshops. The regularity of such 
workshops would be project dependent based on the length of the project, and a recognition of how 
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 Note that the version the authors received was revision 6 and it is likely that risks previously identified but 
subsequently mitigated had been removed from the register 
dynamic the project environment is. However this needs to be tempered with the practicalities of getting 
potential participants together appreciating that recent work has explored the effectiveness of carrying  out 
‘virtual’ workshops where participants contribute at a distance from the facilitator from different locations 
(Duarte and Snyder, 1999; Maznevski and Chudoba, 2000; Pauleen and Yoong, 1987; Scotland et al, 2011). 
In addition, events may occur during the life of a project which have a significant impact on the perception 
of future risks and thus warrant an additional workshop to take place. For example, the approval of a large 
windfarm in Shetland has brought a new perspective to its future energy provision, but also a division in 
support in the local community. 
In addition to the analysis discussed above, the results of the risk prioritisation activities were reported back to 
the client. This provided SHEPD with a prioritised agenda for risk management to provide guidance on where to 
focus their efforts as SHEPD, along with most organisations, had limited resources available to allocate to risk 
management. The systemic nature of the process allowed these resources to be focused on those risks which 
were perceived to be most worthy of attention to ensure the successful implementation of the project. In 
particular, the process highlighted areas of concern such as the impact of local community buy-in and ensuring 
there are sufficient available skilled workforce (see Figure 3) which were areas not traditionally covered by the 
company’s more technically focussed risk assessment process.  
 
5. CONCLUSIONS, LIMITATIONS AND NEXT STEPS 
The introduction to this paper concluded that there was a need for new approaches for managing risk in projects 
to take account of multiple perspectives, a broad comprehensive surfacing of risks, and an appreciation of the 
systemic nature of risk. This paper has presented a process which enables each of these concerns to be attended 
to. Multiple perspectives have been taken into account by including a range of key stakeholders in the process in 
an efficient, rather than time consuming, approach. The process specifically focusses on surfacing a broad range 
of risks and revealing systemicity and systemic properties, such as embedded feedback links, between risks.  
This would not have been possible without taking a holistic view of both risks and their potential impacts. See 
appendix 1 for a summary of benefits, limitations and contributions of the process to risk management. It should 
be noted that the dynamic nature of risks has not been considered explicitly in this paper as this consideration 
will form an important element of the next stage of the project and is discussed later in this section.  
The risk workshop process presented above has been tested in 3 workshops and has proved valuable to the client 
organisation (as evidenced through feedback from participants below). However, it is appreciated that 3 is a 
small number and refinement of the process will be needed based on the experience to date.  Nevertheless, the 
organisation has benefited in a number of ways: 
 The workshops are an interactive process and thus focus the attention of the participants. They 
stimulate active participation (for example in the Shetland workshop, 63 risk statements were generated 
in 11 minutes) , promoting understanding of the numerous risks and their ramifications, and help build 
up a comprehensive view of the NINES project 
 The workshop process offers a different way in which to consider risk assessment and management. 
The maps represent scenarios that demonstrate the systemicity of risk, rather than considering risks in 
isolation from one another and thus potentially missing impacts that may occur due to the interaction 
between risks.  
 The process is inclusive by bringing together the perspectives of multiple stakeholders in the project 
(from project team members to local councillors and wind farm developers). This also encourages cross 
disciplinary learning through an appreciation of how risks from each part of the project impact one 
another.  This provides participants with a holistic view of the risks in the project. 
A key value added to the organisation has been an improvement on traditional methods through the extension of 
its risk assessment process beyond the organization’s standard business risk register (see the quote from the 
NINES project manager below). As previously highlighted, project risk registers assume that individual risks are 
independent from one another (Morris and Pinto, 1987). In addition, in many businesses, the risk register does 
not take such a comprehensive view of risk and does not involve as many perspectives. It is also rarely a 
dynamic process, enabling risk systemicity and its evolving nature to be tracked over the life of a project. 
Initial feedback, gathered from participants, confirmed many of the benefits discussed above. This suggested 
that participants valued each aspect of the process discussed above, as seen through the following quotes: 
 Comprehensive: “Covered lots of potential risks that we hadn’t thought about before.” 
 Interaction between risks: “Given the diversity of group, I was impressed how some of the risks tied 
into each other in both the same and other areas. The cross-links were interesting. I was interested in 
links that come into my area.” 
 Inclusive: “I was very impressed – it got the views of a lot of people and was structured” 
 Holistic: “Got the big picture… rather than looking only at your own area of responsibility.” 
 Improvement on traditional methods: “The traditional method almost tries to get to answers first, as 
risks are based on experience and previous knowledge…. However the workshop approach takes a 
different view by focussing on links and thus picked up on a number of things behind (traditional) risks 
that wouldn’t have been thought about.  We wouldn’t have seen these links in the traditional method as 
you ‘go where you know’. Also it is like-minded/similar people that prepare the risk assessment each 
time. However with workshop a wider group of people involved and thus takes you in a different 
direction.” This final quote was of particular interest as it came from the NINES project manager who 
had overall responsibility to manage risks on this project. 
As noted from the above quotes, the inclusion of problem structuring (through the causal mapping) supported 
the interactive and comprehensive capturing of risks and the group support system enabled participants to 
believe they had improved understanding of risks beyond their established risk analysis methods.  
The above recognises that the described process brought together a number of perspectives on the project. In 
addition to supporting the risk management process, there were also additional benefits for the management of 
the project. For example, it was imperative that SHEPD involved the Shetland community during the project. 
Ensuring that the community were bought into the project and the different activities which were a part of the 
project was seen to be crucial to its success. However, the project manager stated that the workshops played a 
key role in involving the community and understanding their perspectives on the project.   A key challenge 
when working with multiple stakeholders on a project can be difficulties in communication amongst the 
different parties (Ackermann and Eden 2010). The types of workshops described in this paper can help in 
bringing the parties together and supporting discussion on aspects of the project. Indeed similar types of 
workshops could be used to support other aspects of project management or even project design where 
communication is key. 
 
5.1 Limitations and Future Research 
Although a number of benefits have been identified from the workshop process, it is recognised that there are 
some limitations. Each of these limitations will need careful consideration and undertaking further workshops 
will help to improve the process.  
Identified limitations are as follows: 
 The workshops are good at providing buy-in and ownership for those that participate in them. 
However, if the output from the process is required to be reported to other parts of an organisation, then 
people may find it difficult to gain a full appreciation of the contents of the maps – they can be 
overwhelming. People have reported that they prefer multiple risks reported as lists. This is not 
surprising due to most peoples’ lack of familiarity with maps and a systems thinking approach, and 
thus feeling more comfortable in reducing problems into discrete, manageable issues (Ackermann 
2012).  Thus when reporting the outcome of the NINES workshops a mixture of maps and lists were 
used with the lists comprising the key themes that surfaced from the workshops (along with indented 
further detail), enabling some level of the systemicity of the risk structure being retained in the 
reporting process. This issue of determining an accessible representation of the complexity of the risk 
network is an area that will benefit from further work.   
 The ideal situation would be to include all key stakeholders in the workshop process as the final mix of 
participants significantly impacts the overall outcomes of the workshops.  A key stakeholder will have 
knowledge that is germane to the project or power to influence project completion.  However, the 
selection process involved taking account of clients’ wishes with recognising that there were a limited 
number of places available alongside recognising stakeholders’ availability means that there are always 
going to be some key stakeholders missing. For example, in the NINES project it was not possible to 
include the regulator and a key supplier in the process. In addition, some members of the group that 
were to be a part of the process were not able to make the arranged dates due to diary restrictions. The 
process needs to consider how their perspectives can be taken into account to ensure as comprehensive 
coverage of issues as possible and how they can gain buy-in to the outcomes of the process, 
particularly in light of the point made above. 
 When gaining feedback from participants, one person noted that they felt that more time could have 
been spent eliciting risks. Workshop participants are often very busy people, who can only give the 
process a restricted amount of time. The 4-5 hours for the NINES workshops meant that the balance of 
time between eliciting, linking and prioritising risks had to be carefully planned.  It is crucial that the 
workshops are kept to a manageable timeframe otherwise they will simply not work in practice; 
therefore it was not believed to be practical to extend them. More time spent on eliciting risks may 
provide a richer and wider set of risks, but this leaves less time for linking the risks and thus not fully 
capturing the extent of the systemicity in the risks. Within each of the workshops, a judgement was 
made by the facilitator to move onto linking risks when it was perceived that the participants’ rate of 
risk generation had significantly reduced (in essence using a Pareto type judgement call). This was 
informed through the software being able to reveal the rate of risk generation taking place and thus, 
when most participants had’ fallen silent’, the decision to move to the next step could be considered. 
The balance of time between each activity is crucial and it is anticipated that this will be fine-tuned as 
further workshops are undertaken. 
 Participants were sent workbooks after the workshops so that they did not feel that the time spent 
eliciting or linking risks was too restricted. However, not all participants returned material from this 
activity. When in a workshop, participants dedicate their time to the task in hand, however outside this 
event the task may not have been given their full attention, with other work taking priority. One reason 
for this may be that as the workbooks were a new process to the participants, they did not regard them 
as an embedded part of their organisation’s processes and thus did not spend a great deal of time on 
considering risks beyond the scope of the workshop. Where an organisation was to fully adopt and 
embed the process, further priority could be given to this part of the process. This will be an interesting 
area to monitor going forward in the project. 
5.2 Next Steps 
As previously mentioned, 3 workshops have been carried out with key stakeholders in the NINES project. 
However, it is intended to carry out a second tranche of workshops with the same stakeholders 12 months later. 
This is because it is recognised that the project environment constantly changes, the project itself will have 
moved on, and the knowledge of the participants will have changed as a consequence. It is therefore anticipated 
that the output from the second tranche of workshops will be significantly different (in content and structure) 
from the first tranche highlighting the need for regular assessment of risks on the project. These workshops will 
therefore consider how risk priorities have changed over time – taking account of the dynamic nature of risks 
and their interrelationships.  
The risk insights generated through the workshops also inform analysis to support the decision about the design 
of the new power station particularly its capacity. This decision model formalism requires the holistic risks 
identified to be classed and defined as a decision, uncertainty or consequence variable from the perspective of 
SHEPD as the decision-maker. We are exploring how to translate the risk maps created by multiple-stakeholders 
into a formal decision model as well as extending our analysis to elicit subjective probability judgements 
(Bedford et al, 2006; Quigley et al, 2008; Williams et al, 1997) from key stakeholders to populate the decision 
model. Thus the workshops and workshop processes have provided a powerful starting point in terms of 
thinking about the risks of the project, and a good basis upon which to ensure that the changing nature of a wide 
range of risks are considered throughout the life of the project. 
Finally consideration regarding the types of projects amenable to risk workshops and whether adaptations are 
required would add depth to the process. The project addressed in this paper is multi-million dollar, extremely 
complex, and involved a range of stakeholder groups. However, consideration could be given to determining 
how the process can be extended to support projects that encompass a very large stakeholder base. Likewise 
determining the appropriate number and duration of workshops necessary to get both a detailed understanding as 
well as comprehensive capture of risks could further add to the robustness of the approach. 
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Figure 1: Example of a group using the Group Support System to surface and review risks 
 
  
Figure 2: a small segment of a map 
 
Note: The numbers preceding each risk event are reference tags used to facilitate manipulation of the data.  
Legend: the statements boxed and shadowed are outcomes, statements in bold with boxes are key issues, the 
remaining statements are additional information. Numbers attached with dotted arrows represent additional 
material.  
 
Figure 3: Extract from the SHEPD risk map that includes feedback loops.  
Each of the arrows should be read as ‘may lead to’, except for those arrows with a negative sign at the arrow 
head which should be read as ‘may lead to NOT’. 
 
  
  
Appendix 1- Summary of Process 
Stage Process Output Benefits of 
process 
Limitations of 
process 
Additional 
Contribution to 
standard PRR 
process  
0 Selection of 
Participants 
Ensure breadth and 
depth of knowledge 
and involve those 
with interest and 
power on the project 
Shared 
understanding  
Anonymity 
Inclusive 
Availability can 
restrict 
participation 
Stakeholder 
analysis is now 
being given more 
emphasis in 
PMBOK 
1 Elicitation 
and clustering 
of Risks  
Enables consideration 
of  a wide and 
comprehensive range 
of risks  
Fast and thus 
productive 
elicitation 
Interactive 
process 
 
Gaining correct 
balance of time 
spent between 
elicitation and 
linking of risks 
for the specific 
group 
Comprehensive 
consideration of 
risks beyond 
technical and 
financial 
2 Structuring 
and linking of 
Risks 
Risk map that 
captures how risks 
impact one another  
Convergent and 
augmented set of 
views 
Interactive 
process 
Holistic view of 
risks 
Gaining correct 
balance of time 
spent between 
elicitation and 
linking of risks 
for the specific 
group 
Considers  risk 
systemicity  
3 Prioritisation 
of Risks 
Share views on 
probability and 
impact of risks 
Prioritised agenda  of 
those risks that need 
most attention  
Prioritised agenda 
is supported 
through detailed 
maps  
Interactive 
process 
Whilst anchor 
points are 
requested, 
variation is likely 
between 
participants  
Consideration of 
probability and 
impact undertaken 
holistically, with 
reference to risk 
dependency 
4 Workbooks Provides time to add 
to or amend the risk 
maps 
Promotes the risk 
map as a dynamic 
rather than static 
tool 
Can be difficult to 
engage with if did 
not participate in 
workshops 
Getting people to 
take time out of 
their day job to 
consider these 
Continuous 
engagement of wide 
variety of 
stakeholders 
5 Interviews 
with 
participants 
Allow participants to 
add to or amend the 
maps 
Gain feedback on 
process 
Participants are 
able to reflect 
further on risks 
facing the project 
and add links and 
risks 
 Continuous 
engagement of a 
wide variety of 
stakeholders 
6 Analysis of 
resultant 
material 
Compare and contrast 
risk maps, Explore 
systemicity of risk, 
identify most 
significant risks and 
consider impact of 
feedback loops  
  Analyse the impact 
of the 
interdependence of 
risks 
7 Report 
findings 
Highlight emergent 
themes, significant 
and priority risks 
   
 
